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BACK DOOR ARBITRATION: WHY ALLOWING
NONSIGNATORIES TO UNFAIRLY UTILIZE
ARBITRATION CLAUSES MAY VIOLATE THE
SEVENTH AMENDMENT
Nima H. Mohebbi*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1925, amidst prevalent judicial hostility toward arbitration,
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).1 The FAA was
enacted to address the existing judicial hostility2 by placing a premium on
the enforcement of arbitration agreements,3 and expressing a federal policy
favoring arbitration.4 This pro-arbitration policy has sometimes, however,
trumped equitable, statutory, and even constitutional mandates.
* I would like to thank Joseph Profaizer for his invaluable guidance and astute
suggestions on this topic. Many thanks are also due to Craig Reiser for his comments
throughout the writing process, and to Vianney Lopez and all of the editors at the Journal
who worked on this article.
1. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006) (originally enacted as the United States Arbitration Act, ch.
213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925)).
2. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 68-96 (1924) (noting judicial reluctance to enforce certain
types of arbitration agreements).
3. See generally JON O. SHIMABUKURO, THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT:
BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for
Congress Order Code RL30934, updated Aug. 15, 2003), available at
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-3879:1
(discussing
the
legislative history and subsequent judicial interpretation of the FAA).
4. See, e.g., Hall St. Assoc. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402 (2008) (“Congress
enacted the FAA to replace judicial indisposition to arbitration with a ‘national policy
favoring [it] and plac[ing] arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts.’”
(citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006))); see also
Frank Z. LaForge, Inequitable Estoppel: Arbitrating with Nonsignatory Defendants Under
Grigson v. Creative Artists, 84 TEX. L. REV. 225, 228-29 (2005) (noting judicial resistance
to enforcing arbitration agreements before and after the enactment of the FAA).
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Recently, the Supreme Court decided the case of Arthur Andersen
LLP v. Carlisle, holding that nonsignatories to arbitration agreements may
appeal denials of motions to stay litigation under the FAA.5 In so holding,
however, the Court has opened a potential floodgate by implicitly
authorizing the common practice by which federal courts permit
nonsignatories to take unfair advantage of arbitration clauses where they
would not otherwise have a legitimate expectation to invoke such clauses.
As an example of this latter phenomenon, various courts have permitted
nonsignatories to compel plaintiffs to submit to binding arbitration under
an application of equitable estoppel that does not require proving that the
plaintiff unreasonably relied on an agreement containing a clause to
arbitrate in asserting any claims.6 Moreover, this doctrine does not require
the nonsignatory to prove equitable estoppel’s traditional elements of
misrepresentation and detrimental reliance.7
This application of equitable estoppel can be illustrated with a
hypothetical example. Envision a case involving a plaintiff8 who has
suffered damages pursuant to a breached contract with one party (“Party
A”), and assume that the contract contains an agreement to submit all
claims arising from any breach between the parties to binding arbitration.
Further assume that a third party (“Party B”), who was not a signatory to
the arbitration agreement, is joined in the litigation and seeks a motion to
compel the plaintiff to submit the claims against her to arbitration, or seeks
to stay the already-initiated litigation so that an arbitration may take place.
Party B reasons essentially that overlapping allegations of factually
interdependent misconduct exist between the plaintiff’s claims against both
Party A and Party B, and as such, the court should require the plaintiff to
arbitrate his claims against Party B as well. Obviously, the parties must
arbitrate if Party B’s motion is granted. If Party B’s motion is denied,
however, Party B may appeal the denial.9 This article contends that
allowing nonsignatories to invoke arbitration clauses under the latter
application of equitable estoppel may violate the Seventh Amendment.10

5. 129 S.Ct. 1896 (2009) (“Carlisle”).
6. See, e.g., infra Section III.B; cf. Ross v. Am. Express Co., 478 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir.
2007) (holding that a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement could compel arbitration
under the common law principle of equitable estoppel where claims with multiple
defendants were “inextricably intertwined”).
7. Id.
8. This article will use the term “plaintiff” interchangeably with “signatory” when
discussing a party who is forced to arbitrate pursuant to this doctrine.
9. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A)-(C) (permitting appeals of interlocutory orders denying
motions to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings pending arbitration).
10. The Seventh Amendment states:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
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The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to jury trial in federal
courts for actions that existed at law11 prior to the merger of law and equity
that occurred with the passage of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.12
By permitting nonsignatories to make unfair use of arbitration clauses,
plaintiffs may lose the right to have a jury hear legal claims. This is
because, in these instances, the plaintiff may not fairly anticipate having to
arbitrate with a nonsignatory. The effect is a prime collateral consequence
of the broad federal pro-arbitration policy, which the Supreme Court
endorsed in Carlisle by refusing to categorically require that a litigant be a
party to a written agreement containing an arbitration clause in order to
possess an ability to stay litigation—and by logical extension, to compel
arbitration—under the FAA.13
There has been little literature on this topic. One commentator,
Professor Jean Sternlight, has suggested that the federal policy in favor of
binding arbitration14 may in many instances have the general effect of
denying litigants a right to trial by jury.15 This is because these litigants
often do not knowingly or intelligently waive their right to jury trial when
they are forced to arbitrate under the FAA.16 Indeed, the pro-arbitration
policy in many cases trumps alternative considerations and courts
frequently consider it a dispositive factor.17 The actions taken by courts in
cases that apply equitable estoppel provide a convincing illustration of this
aspect. Another commentator, Frank LaForge, uses these cases to illustrate
that permitting nonsignatories to compel arbitration under the theory of

shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
11. See Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504-07 (1959) (discussing the
impact of the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the
analysis of standards for equitable jurisdiction).
12. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There is one form of action—the civil action.”).
13. 129 S.Ct. 1896 (2009).
14. See e.g., Hall St. Assoc. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1402 (2008) (discussing
the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA).
15. See Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of
Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 10-19 (1997) (positing that the
Supreme Court’s preference for binding arbitration over litigation is unconstitutional).
16. See infra Section III.C (discussing jurisprudence of jury trial waivers). In addition,
Sternlight suggests that the pro-arbitration policy preference may pose numerous other
constitutional problems. See Sternlight, supra note 15, at 7 (suggesting that some binding
arbitration clauses may violate the Due Process Clause and deny prospective litigants the
right to an Article III judge).
17. See, e.g., Realty Trust Group, Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
91331, at *9 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 11, 2007) (“In general, courts recognize a strong federal
policy in favor of arbitration, and any doubts about the scope of an agreement are to be
resolved in favor of arbitration . . . .”).
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equitable estoppel is not equitable at all, principally because, as noted
above, the theory lacks the requirements of misrepresentation and
detrimental reliance, and confuses the actual parties at controversy.18
This article contends that a litigant’s right to jury trial can be unfairly
usurped partially because of LaForge’s analysis that allowing
nonsignatories to invoke arbitration clauses under this doctrine maintains
no basis in traditional equity principles. Moreover, as a corollary to
LaForge’s argument, this article further contends that a party who is forced
to arbitrate under the latter application of equitable estoppel cannot be said
to have either knowingly waived his right to jury trial or mutually assented
to an agreement to arbitrate with a nonsignatory. The FAA seems to
attempt to prevent the latter consequence in the statutory text by requiring
the existence of a written agreement before a party may avail itself of the
ability to stay litigation or compel arbitration.19 However, just as many
other cases before it, Carlisle embraced the broad federal pro-arbitration
policy and rejected the latter limiting provision, implicitly sanctioning the
ability of nonsignatories to divest litigants of their right to jury trial.20 This
is, moreover, only one potential consequence. Worse yet, without a
“written agreement” limitation, third-party nonsignatories could likely have
unfettered access to arbitration clauses to which they were not initially a
party.
This article proceeds as follows: Sections II.A and II.B give a brief
overview of the historical origins of American arbitration law. Section II.C
introduces the applicable provisions under the FAA that permit
nonsignatories both to compel arbitration and to stay litigation. Section
II.D discusses the Seventh Amendment and the right to trial by jury in civil
actions. Finally, Section III presents the argument that the broad holding in
Carlisle implicitly sanctions the common practice in federal courts of
allowing nonsignatories access to arbitration clauses under a misapplication
of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Because a litigant is unfairly required
to arbitrate and cannot be said to have legitimately waived his right to jury
trial under these circumstances, this is but one of the opinion’s foreseeable
consequences that may violate the Constitution.

18. See LaForge, supra note 4, at 242-47 (distinguishing the Fifth Circuit’s test in
Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2000) from the
traditional principles of equitable estoppel requiring both misrepresentation and detrimental
reliance).
19. See infra Section III.A (discussing implications of equitable estoppel on the right to
jury trial).
20. 129 S.Ct. 1896 (2009).
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II. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW
The United States legal system acquired its early views toward
arbitration from English jurisprudence.21 This procured mentality involved
judicial hostility to enforcing arbitration agreements, and was the basis for
the ultimate enactment of the FAA.22 The latter fact provides context for
understanding both the federal pro-arbitration policy and the current
preference of many courts for arbitration over litigation under a variety of
circumstances, even when maintaining that preference may be inequitable
and may potentially run afoul of the Constitution.
A. A Brief History of Arbitration in England
The collapse of the Roman Empire brought forth a near halt in
international commerce in Europe.23 The cohesive structure of the Roman
Empire was ultimately replaced with a decentralized system of regional
interaction, particularly with respect to trade.24 The eleventh century,
however, brought increased agricultural production, enabling society to
sustain growing populations.25 In turn, urban migration increased, and
merchant classes emerged.26
These merchants, separated by various barriers, needed a mechanism
to facilitate trade.27 The mechanism that met this demand was the law
merchant, an informal body of rules created to enforce merchant trading
customs.28 Because of a lack of a uniform centralized body of governance,
disputes were typically adjudicated by private arbitration.29 Merchants
21. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637, 644-47 (1996)
(discussing early American arbitration jurisprudence).
22. Id.
23. See JAMES WILLIAM ERMATINGER, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE
68 (Greenwood Press 2004) (chronicling the history of the Roman Empire’s collapse and its
effect on increased regional interaction).
24. Id.
25. See Peter T. Leeson, One More Time With Feeling: The Law Merchant,
Arbitration, and International Trade, 2007 INDIAN J. OF ECON. & BUS. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 29,
30 (discussing development of merchant classes that followed from increased agricultural
production and urban migration).
26. Id.
27. See id. at 30 (“Merchants throughout Europe were separated by language, distance,
and local law. To facilitate trade and interaction a common set of commercial ‘rules’ was
needed.”).
28. Id.
29. Id.; see also Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court's
Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L.
REV. 789, 793 (2002) (attributing the continued practice of arbitration in England since the
medieval period to the “need for a speedy and efficient dispute resolution mechanism as . . .
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chose arbitrators who could facilitate efficient adjudication of disputes and
account for cultural differences with foreign traders.30
For centuries, arbitration remained the primary method for resolving
commercial disputes in England.31 Eventually, however, English common
law judges became hostile toward arbitration, fearing that its continued use
would weaken the English court system.32 Accordingly, it became routine
for judges to avoid enforcing arbitration clauses in contracts.33
B. Early American Arbitration and the Passage of the Federal Arbitration
Act
The English judicial hostility to arbitration agreements crept into the

[merchants] traded . . . in foreign markets”).
30. Id. at 793. Interestingly, the early popularity of arbitration formed somewhat out of
market distrust of state-sponsored methods for dispute resolution. See Leeson, supra note
25, at 31-32 (responding to critics who suggest otherwise). Professor Leeson writes:
In the 20th century private international arbitration associations sprung up.
Arbitration associations operate much like the medieval merchant courts
discussed above. These organizations emerged in response to the demands of
international traders who viewed state courts as inferior mechanisms of dispute
resolution. State courts posed a number of practical problems for resolving
international commercial disagreements. Competing jurisdictional claims
between states was one issue. The refusal of some nations’ courts to adjudicate
international commercial contracts was another.
Id.
31. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration:
The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64
UMKC L. REV. 449, 461 (1996) (noting the primacy of arbitration throughout the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).
32. See id. (“Eventually, however, common law judges became concerned that the
merchants’ ability to systematically circumvent common law court procedures by agreeing
to submit their disputes to arbitration had resulted in a reduction of the judges' salaries.”
(citing Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wils. 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (1746))).
33. Professor Cole suggests, “[t]o avoid losing fees to arbitrators, common law judges
developed what came to be known as the ‘ouster doctrine.’ Allegedly originating in the
seventeenth century, judges used the ouster doctrine to invalidate executory agreements to
arbitrate in a series of cases during the eighteenth century.” Id. at 462. Although most
disputes submitted to arbitration during this time were commercial in nature, courts often
found ways around enforcing arbitration clauses. See Jeffery W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public
Policy: The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259, 272 (1990) (“In some
English cases, the courts found predispute arbitration agreements voidable at the option of
either party. In other cases, probably the majority, the courts viewed the arbitration
agreement, particularly if it was evidenced by a signed writing, as a legitimate contract, but
one that was not specifically enforceable.”).
The doctrine of revocability was another mechanism used by the courts to circumvent
enforcing arbitration clauses. See Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Backgrounds of
Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 132, 138 (1934) (tracing the doctrine of
revocability to dictum by Lord Coke in Vynior’s Case, 8 Co. 80a, 81b, (1609)).
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early colonies that became the United States,34 but as the country grew,
merchants increasingly turned to arbitration to adjudicate commercial
disputes.35 Thus, the business community eventually sought to reverse the
residual judicial hostility,36 and looked to Congress for a solution.37
Congress answered with the passage of the FAA.
The original draft of what would ultimately become the FAA was
enacted in 1925,38 principally to address the problems of judicial hostility
toward arbitration in the United States court system.39 Despite initial
questions on the federal exclusivity of arbitration,40 the Supreme Court
eventually interpreted the FAA to preempt state law limiting the ability of
parties to submit their claims to arbitration at variance with the FAA.41
Still, state law plays a very important role in federal arbitration
jurisprudence with respect to providing guidance as to whether a contract

34. See Stempel, supra note 33, at 274 (discussing the early development of American
arbitration).
35. Id. at 275. See also William C. Jones, An Inquiry Into the History of the
Adjudication of Mercantile Disputes in Great Britain and the United States, 25 U. CHI. L.
REV. 445, 461-62 (1958) (“Statistics are not available and it is doubtful that they ever will
be, but it is probable that in the nineteenth century arbitration in one form or another became
the most important form of mercantile dispute settlement . . . in the United States . . .
although courts continued, of course, to be used.”).
36. See Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F. 319, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)
(recognizing the general displeasure in the business community with courts’ unwillingness
to enforce arbitration agreements in the early twentieth century). This view, however, was
not uniform, and many courts began to take individual notice of the need for a jurisprudence
favoring arbitration, even though a national policy favoring arbitration had not yet been
made official. See e.g., Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 290-92 (N.Y.
1921) (Cardozo, J.) (recognizing the importance of arbitration agreements, but noting
common law limitations on enforcement).
37. H.R. REP. NO. 96, at 1-2 (1924).
38. 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006)).
39. The original act was not initially known as the FAA; it was known as the United
States Federal Arbitration Act (“USAA”). IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW
102-15 (1992). The American Bar Association (“ABA”), following a series of legislative
exchanges with Congress, ultimately submitted a bill in 1923, which Congress enacted
without much change. See generally id. at 102 (providing a more in-depth discussion about
the legislative history of the FAA).
40. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1
(1842), on the ground that it is unconstitutional to permit federal courts to ignore state
autonomy by applying federal substantive common law, and thus held that federal district
courts are required to apply state substantive law in diversity cases. The Court later applied
the basic Erie principle to require the application of state arbitration law in 1956, creating
obvious conflicts with the substantive provisions of the FAA. See MACNEIL, supra note 39,
at 136, 169 (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956)).
41. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1984) (holding that the FAA
preempts state law limiting the enforcement of arbitration agreements); cf. Kenneth F.
Dunham, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 197, 199 (2006) (discussing alternative views on the
implications of Southland).
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containing an arbitration clause is valid in the first instance.42
C. The Basic Structure of the FAA and the General Right to Stay Litigation
and Compel Arbitration Pursuant to a Valid Contract
The FAA—codified at Title 9 of the United States Code43—provides a
federal mechanism for the recognition of agreements to arbitrate claims.44
The Act has a domestic portion,45 and codifies two international arbitration
treaties: The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards (“The New York Convention”),46 and the Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration.47 This article focuses
on the domestic sections dealing with parties’ ability to compel arbitration
and stay litigation pursuant to otherwise valid agreements.48
The first of these sections, 9 U.S.C. § 3, provides in pertinent part:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the
United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an
agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such
suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in
such or proceeding is referable to arbitration under . . . [the]
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial
of the action until such arbitration . . . [occurs].49
Thus, § 3 provides the statutory authority for district courts to stay
trials pending arbitration in cases for which federal subject matter
jurisdiction already exists.50 Section 4 provides:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of
42. Note, An Unnecessary Choice of Law: Volt, Mastrobuono, and Federal Arbitration
Act Preeemption, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2250, 2253 (2002) (discussing the extent of federal
preemption of state arbitration law); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of
Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 101, 112 (2002) (discussing the Southland Court’s examination of the
legislative history of the FAA in the latter regard).
43. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
44. Id. § 2 (“A written provision . . . evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”).
45. Id. §§ 1-16.
46. Id. §§ 201-08.
47. Id. §§ 301-07.
48. Whether the domestic sections of the act apply concomitantly with the foreign
provisions can be significant in many contexts. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 464 (1994) (discussing the various views
and interpretative problems on the application of the domestic provisions of the FAA to the
international provisions).
49. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added).
50. Id.
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another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may
petition any United States district court which, save for such
agreement, would have jurisdiction . . . of the subject matter of a
suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner
provided for in such agreement.51
This section establishes a mechanism for a litigant to petition the
district court for an order to compel arbitration when an opposing party
who has previously agreed to arbitrate claims under an agreement suddenly
refuses to do so.52 The litigant must present another basis for federal
subject matter jurisdiction before the court may compel arbitration53—
again, at least with respect to domestic actions.54
Thus, §§ 3 and 4 are the primary vehicles both to stay proceedings
pending arbitration and to compel arbitration when necessary.55 In
addition, the FAA provides for an interlocutory appeal of the refusal to
grant a stay under § 3 and a denial of a petition under § 4.56
Section 16, which deals with such appeals under §§ 3 and 4, provides
in pertinent part:
(a) An appeal may be taken from—
(1) an order—
(A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of
this title,
(B) denying a petition under section 4 of this
title.57
Accordingly, assuming that a valid contract exists, a denial of a
51. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (emphasis added).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Cf. Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Egyptian Arab Republic, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C.
1996) (finding subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case to enforce an award rendered in
another country—on grounds other than under the New York Convention—in order to
illustrate the availability of a right to enforcement under U.S. arbitration law). As an
interesting caveat, the Chromalloy decision has been heavily criticized by many scholars.
See, e.g., William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration, 93 AM. J.
INT’L. L. 805, 807 (1999) (noting that the court reached this conclusion “[i]n an opinion
[supported by] neither precedent nor progeny”).
55. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4.
56. Id. § 16.
57. Id.
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motion to stay litigation or to compel arbitration may be appealed
immediately.58 Most importantly, the ability to compel or to request a stay
appears to call for the existence of a contract containing an agreement to
arbitrate disputes. As this article illustrates, concluding from these sections
that Congress did not intend to place a limiting gloss on state substantive
contract law by imposing a requirement that there be a written agreement
between parties before a litigant may avail itself of these provisions leads to
a result that is potentially problematic from a policy perspective,59 and
constitutionally deficient.
D. The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial
“The Seventh Amendment preserves to litigants the right to jury trial
in suits at common law.”60 The Supreme Court has set forth further rules
explaining the meaning of the Seventh Amendment and providing a context
for understanding when a litigant is to be afforded the right to trial by
jury.61 Specifically, courts are to apply a “historical test,” ascertaining
whether the parties to a cause of action would have had the right to have
their claims tried by a jury in England in 1791—the time at which the
Seventh Amendment was adopted.62 Generally, if a party’s claim involves
an action at law—meaning that it could have been brought in a court with
legal jurisdiction at the common law63—a jury must be afforded if properly

58. Id. Section 16 provides a statutory exception to the final judgment rule, 28 U.S.C. §
1291. The final judgment rule provides that appeals from district court rulings generally can
be taken only if the district court has rendered final decisions on the issues presented below.
28 U.S.C. § 1291; see also Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C.
L. REV. 1237, 1247-70 (2007) (discussing other well-recognized exceptions to the final
judgment rule).
59. See Arthur Andersen, L.L.P. v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1093-94 (2009) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (noting the policy problems presented by permitting nonsignatories to avail
themselves of arbitration clauses in order to obtain stays of litigation under § 3).
60. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VII
(guaranteeing the right to trial by jury in suits at common law when the value in controversy
exceeds a minimum value of twenty dollars).
61. See Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (holding that legal claims
must be tried to a jury before any equitable claims with overlapping issues of fact can be
decided). The Court has further held that equitable issues must be tried after legal issues
even if they are only incidental to the equitable issues. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S.
469, 473-74 (1962).
62. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935); see also Margaret L. Moses, What the
Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court's Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 199 (2000) (“The historical test is one means of determining
whether parties to a particular action have the right to a jury trial.”).
63. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830) (finding that the Seventh
Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial for suits in “law” within the meaning of
Article III).
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requested.64 The overarching common law distinction between law and
equity has been replaced, however, as there is now only one form of action
permitted in the federal courts under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
a civil action.65 Moreover, the analysis becomes more complicated if the
claim is for an action that did not exist at the common law, neither as an
equitable nor legal claim.66
In Ross v. Bernhard, the Supreme Court developed a three-pronged
test to ascertain whether the right to trial by jury exists in cases that present
neither clearly legal nor clearly equitable claims.67 Specifically, the Court
stated, “[a]s our cases indicate, the ‘legal’ nature of an issue is determined
by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such
questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and
limitations of juries.”68
The extent to which the right to a jury trial is implicated at all in the
following discussion, then, depends on whether a right to a jury trial exists
in the first instance. This article will not analyze numerous distinctive fact
patterns in order to determine whether the right to trial by jury should be
available in any one particular case; it suggests only that where a party’s
claims are able to be submitted to a jury, they should be, and a
nonsignatory should not be able to subvert that result by utilizing an
arbitration clause under a misapplication of equitable estoppel.
In undertaking this analysis, one must keep in mind that Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 38(b) provides that a party “waives [the right to] a jury
trial” unless he complies with the demands of the rule.69 This latter aspect
has substantial implication regarding the voluntariness of arbitration
agreements in general, because if a party has signed an agreement to
arbitrate claims, the argument ostensibly may be advanced that the right to
trial by jury is waived as a result.70
III. A DISCUSSION

A. How the Federal Pro-Arbitration Policy Sometimes Usurps the Right to
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b) (requiring that a party requesting a jury trial must make proper
demand).
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There is one form of action—the civil action.”).
66. See Moses, supra note 62, at 197-99 (showing the Justices’ divergent views on the
importance of finding historical analogues to current causes of action in ascertaining the
right to a jury trial).
67. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
68. Id. at 538 n.10. The third prong articulated in Ross was altered in subsequent cases.
See Moses, supra note 62, at 197 (providing more information on Ross and its progeny).
69. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b). Failure to make demand amounts to waiver. Id.
70. See infra, Section III.C (discussing waiver issues in greater detail).
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Trial by Jury
Because the FAA provides that ordinary common law contract
principles still govern questions as to whether an agreement to arbitrate is
actually valid,71 the result in cases where a party loses the right to a jury
trial pursuant to an arbitration clause invoked by a nonsignatory under a
traditional state contract theory may seem at first blush to accord with the
Act’s mandates. As noted in the section below, the Supreme Court, at least
implicitly, agreed with this proposition in Carlisle.
1. Carlisle and Its Potential Implications
In May of 2009, the Supreme Court decided the case of Arthur
Andersen, L.L.P. v. Carlisle.72 In this case, the Court was faced with two
questions: (1) whether § 16 of the FAA vests federal courts with
interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over denials of motions to stay under §
3 filed by nonsignatories to arbitration agreements; and (2) whether
nonsignatories can obtain stays of litigation under the FAA in any event.73
In Carlisle, the three respondents sold their construction company
seeking to minimize tax liability from the sale.74 Through a series of
consultations with their tax advisor, Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., they were
referred to two other firms for legal advice on the transaction.75 These
firms recommended that the respondents implement a “‘leveraged option
strategy’ tax shelter designed to create illusory losses through foreigncurrency-exchange options.”76 Further, in line with the advice, the
respondents created various limited liability corporations to carry out the
71. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
72. 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009).
73. Id. at 1896-99. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on these issues, see Carlisle v.
Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, L.L.P., 521 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2008), cert granted,
Arthur Andersen L.L.P. v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 529 (2008), to resolve confusion among
circuits. Compare Ross v. Am. Express Co., 478 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that
nonsignatories can compel arbitration under the doctrine of equitable estoppel and that the
court had jurisdiction to hear appeals of denials of motions to compel pursuant to that
theory), with DSMC Inc. v. Convera Corp., 349 F.3d 679, 680-83 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding
that § 16(a)(1)(A) or (B) is insufficient to give appellate jurisdiction to a nonsignatory’s
attempt to compel arbitration pursuant to the doctrine of equitable estoppel). One court
previously attempted to reconcile the differences between opinions of different courts in
cases implicating the international provisions of the FAA. See Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v.
Asimco Int'l, Inc., 526 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that nonsignatories should be
permitted to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 206 and that nothing in the statutory
language suggests there is any limitation on this right—or the right to appeal denials of a
motion to compel).
74. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. at 1899.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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scheme, and these corporations “entered into investment-management
agreements with [one of the firms,]” which required all disputes arising out
of the agreements to be submitted to arbitration.77 The IRS later
determined the scheme to be an illegal tax shelter, and the respondents
subsequently filed a diversity suit against all of the firms under the
agreements for rendering flawed and fraudulent advice.78
The defendant-firms that were not signatories to the underlying
investment-management agreements moved to stay the action under § 3 of
the FAA, “arguing that the principles of equitable estoppel demanded that
respondents arbitrate their claims under the investment agreements.”79 The
district court denied the motion, and the nonsignatory firms appealed.80
The Sixth Circuit held that it did not have appellate jurisdiction to hear the
appeal under § 16(a)(1) of the FAA because that section only makes
reviewable the denial of a motion under § 3, and § 3 requires the existence
of a written agreement between the parties who wish to arbitrate, which
was ostensibly absent in the case.81
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit on the jurisdictional
question.82 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia noted that “[§ 16]
unambiguously makes the underlying merits [of an appeal] irrelevant, for
even utter frivolousness of the underlying request for a § 3 stay cannot turn
a denial into something other than ‘an order . . . refusing a stay of any
action under section 3.’”83 Thus, the Court held that “any litigant who asks
for [and is denied] a stay . . . is entitled to an immediate appeal.”84
But Justice Scalia did not stop at holding that lower courts should not
conflate the jurisdictional question under § 16 with the underlying merits
question—that is, whether a litigant is entitled to invoke an arbitration
clause—but he continued to address the Court of Appeals’ “ground for
finding [the] appeal meritless[.]”85 In doing so, he echoed the same federal
pro-arbitration mantra that the Court has systematically repeated in the
past.86 The Court reasoned that, because § 2 of the FAA “creates
substantive federal law regarding the enforceability of arbitration
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. at 1900.
80. Id.
81. Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F.3d 597, 600 (6th Cir.
2008).
82. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. at 1900.
83. Id. at 1901 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 16).
84. Id. at 1900.
85. Id. at 1901 (noting that “if the Court of Appeals is correct on the merits point we
will have awarded petitioners a remarkably hollow victory.”).
86. Id. (stating that arbitration agreements should be placed on equal footing with other
contracts (quoting Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 478 (1989))).

MOHEBBIFINALIZED_SEVEN

568

3/31/2010 2:05:29 AM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 12:2

agreements,” it does not purport to “alter background principles of state
contract law regarding the scope of agreements[.]”87 And, as a logical
subsequent inference, categorically mandating the existence of a written
agreement to invoke § 3—and by extension, § 16—ignores the fact that,
under traditional state contract law, nonparties can enforce contracts.88
The result broadens the scope of access to arbitration agreements and
is part and parcel with the federal pro-arbitration policy.89 That is, by
attempting to craft a narrow holding on the scope of appellate jurisdiction
under § 16, and by ignoring the apparent textual mandate of a written
agreement between parties under § 3, Justice Scalia has implicitly
sanctioned the ability of federal courts to allow nonsignatories to
arbitration agreements the option of staying litigation and compelling
arbitration under a potential surfeit of theories that unfairly may usurp the
jury trial right.
Justice Souter, writing for the dissent in Carlisle, noted the problem
of permitting nonsignatories to invoke § 3, but under different reasoning.
Specifically, he wrote that, because of the federal policy disfavoring
interlocutory appeals, § 3 should be read to impose a federal requirement
that a written agreement exist before a party may be permitted to stay court
proceedings pending arbitration.90 This independent limitation seems to be
reasonable given that § 3 textually permits a court to grant stays only where
there is “an agreement in writing,”91 and § 4 appears to permit parties to
compel arbitration only under “a written agreement.”92 As Justice Souter
stated, this requirement would “provid[e] a bright-line rule with predictable
results to aid courts in determining jurisdiction over § 16 interlocutory
appeals . . . [and] mitigat[e] the risk of intentional delay by savvy parties
who seek to frustrate litigation by gaming the system.”93 More importantly
for the purposes of this article, however, the requirement would also
eliminate the ability of courts to eradicate a signatory-party’s right to jury
trial and access to the court system for the mere sake of efficiency and the
federal pro-arbitration policy.
Again, it must be acknowledged that Justice Scalia attempted to
narrow the Court’s holding by stating that “we need not decide here
whether the relevant state contract law recognizes equitable estoppel as a
87. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. at 1901-02.
88. Id. at 1902 (noting that such nonparties can enforce an agreement under doctrines
such as “‘assumption, piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by reference,
third-party beneficiary theories, waiver and estoppel[.]’” (quoting 21 SAMUEL WILLISTON &
RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 57.19 (4th ed. 2001))).
89. Id.
90. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. at 1903-04 (Souter, J., dissenting).
91. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
92. Id. § 4.
93. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. at 1904 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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ground for enforcing contracts against third parties, what standard it would
apply, and whether petitioners would be entitled to relief under it.”94 Yet,
by refusing to categorically exempt third parties from enforcing arbitration
clauses under § 3, he has given courts a carte blanche to disregard litigants’
right of access to the courts. To illustrate this proposition, this article uses
only the application of equitable estoppel by many circuits—a doctrine
under which courts often do not determine whether an arbitration clause is
valid, but inquire only as to whether a nonsignatory can avail itself of the
clause—as a prime example. This application lends to a remarkably unfair
result not supported by an application of true common law equitable
estoppel.95 It permits the plaintiffs, in the mentioned cases, to lose
completely the right to have their legal claims heard by a jury and gives
appellate courts the opportunity to review such denials, vesting another
judicial body with the capacity to usurp the traditional jury function.96
However, how the jury trial right is implicated in these cases must first be
discussed.
2. How the Right to Jury Trial is Implicated in Equitable
Estoppel Cases
Perhaps the ultimate result in Carlisle is supported by the federal
policy preferring arbitration to litigation in most circumstances.97 It may
even be argued that it promotes efficiency in many respects because most
cases presenting this issue involve a plaintiff asserting claims against
numerous defendants—claims that involve many overlapping issues of law
and fact. But this policy preference of efficiency should not come at the
expense of constitutional rights and fairness to litigants who have little
means of otherwise altering their conduct in order to avoid having a
nonsignatory avail itself of an arbitration clause.
In the spirit of this argument, Professor Sternlight has shown that
practitioners and courts have largely ignored various constitutional
violations presented by the federal policy favoring binding arbitration.98 As

94. Id. at 1903.
95. See infra Section II.B. (suggesting that this happens because, in such cases, the
courts do not apply the rules of traditional estoppel and do not require a minimal showing of
misrepresentation and detrimental reliance).
96. See infra Section II.B. (stating that when the court allows a nonsignatory defendant
to compel arbitration, the plaintiff loses his right to a jury trial).
97. See Ross v. Am. Express Co., 478 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that permitting
nonsignatories to avail themselves of arbitration clauses under the theory of equitable
estoppel accords with the federal pro-arbitration policy and avoids “unnecessary
complexities in cases involving arbitration agreements”).
98. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (recognizing that the federal preference
for arbitration often denies plaintiffs of their right to trial by jury). As an interesting
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mentioned below in Section III.C., she notably contends that, because
traditional waiver standards required for the relinquishment of the jury trial
right are not even considered by most courts, many arbitration agreements
simply usurp the right without any contemplation of the collateral effects.99
This is particularly true when arbitration clauses are unfairly imposed.100
Indeed, it must be acknowledged that a jury can provide the benefit of
a neutral—and perhaps sympathetic—factfinder in cases where an
opposing party has much greater resources.101 However, the fact that a jury
corollary on efficiency considerations, one commentator has similarly suggested that courts
sometimes ignore the requirements of the Seventh Amendment in the dispositive motion
context. See Craig M. Reiser, Comment, The Unconstitutional Application of Summary
Judgment in Factually Intensive Inquiries, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 195, 221 (2009)
(“[P]rinciples of judicial economy make it easy to comprehend why there may be a
proclivity to enter docket-clearing summary judgment grants in weak jury cases . . . [but]
compromising constitutional rights for efficiency’s sake is an unconstitutional solution.”).
99. Id.
100. Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute
for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 22 (2003); see also Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth
J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business
Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 102 n. 167 (2004)
(recognizing that unconscionable arbitration clauses prevent the law from being properly
enforced). Professor Sternlight notes that “[a]lthough one of the most significant aspects of
mandatory arbitration is that it denies claimants access to court or to a jury trial, lawyers,
courts, and policy makers have typically failed to pay sufficient attention to jury trial
guarantees.” Sternlight, supra, at 20. Professor Sternlight discusses the willingness of some
state courts to address the obvious implication of a litigant potentially losing the right to trial
by jury pursuant to a mandatory arbitration clause. See id. at 21 (citing Kloss v. Edward D.
Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J., concurring) (discussing the holding of the
case where a litigant did not waive her Montana right to trial by jury by signing an
agreement to arbitrate because voluntariness was not shown)). Interestingly, she also
discusses how other state courts are unwilling to address this problem. See id. at 32 (citing
Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 565 A.2d 908 (Del. 1989) (upholding an
agreement to arbitrate despite the plaintiff’s lack of knowledge as to the existence of an
arbitration clause in the contract)).
101. The Supreme Court has also offered the following rationale in favor of a jury:
“Twelve men of the average of the community . . . know more of the common affairs of life
than does one man, [and it is assumed] that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from
admitted facts thus occurring than can a single judge.” R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664
(1873).
However, overly extolling the virtues of a jury trial may unfairly devalue the benefit
arbitration provides to litigants—particularly businesses—who desire quicker and more
efficient dispute resolution. See Murray S. Levin, The Role of Substantive Law in Business
Arbitration and the Importance of Volition, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 105, 106 (1997) (stating that
“[a]rbitration is intended to provide a quicker, less expensive, and more private alternative
to litigation”).
Further, this article does not purport to suggest that juries may be superior in all respects to
experts in adjudicating complicated disputes. The Supreme Court has recognized this
aspect, for example, by holding that the construction questions on patents are to be made by
judges. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 379-81 (1996) (noting the
limitations of juries).
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trial is a constitutional right in the first instance cannot be refuted.102 The
Supreme Court has itself recognized that arbitration should not be a matter
of coercion in stripping litigants of their right of access to the courts,103 and
it has further suggested that the FAA “‘does not require parties to arbitrate
when they have not agreed to do so.’”104 As this article attempts to show,
in cases where a nonsignatory is permitted to compel arbitration under a
misapplication of traditional equitable estoppel, what occurs in substance is
that a litigant who was not an actual or anticipated party to the agreement
can bind another who was, preventing her from receiving her day in court
before a jury.105
Furthermore, although the FAA makes arbitration clauses enforceable
on the basis of state law—as expressed in Carlisle under § 2106—it seems
unlikely that Congress originally intended that this substantive provision
would permit federal courts to adopt a rule allowing a nonsignatory to
unfairly submit another party to arbitration pursuant to a flawed theory.
This is evidenced by the seemingly independent requirement of a written
agreement stated in §§ 3 and 4, a limitation that Justice Scalia rejected.107
In that vein, the following section discusses just how various federal courts
both frequently and unfairly misapply equitable estoppel.
B. Misapplying Equitable Estoppel
Carlisle’s implicit sanction of the application of equitable estoppel
adopted by many circuits is but one of the potential encompassing effects
of the Court’s decision to keep the door open for nonsignatory third parties
to utilize arbitration agreements at the expense of litigants’ jury trial rights.
In that vein, Frank LaForge’s argument illustrates the problems with
equitable estoppel as it is applied by courts in this context.108 Namely, he

102. See supra Section II.C. (recognizing that there is a constitutional right to trial by
jury).
103. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002) (noting that
“‘[a]rbitration under the [FAA]’” should be “‘a matter of consent, not coercion’” (quoting
Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479
(1989))).
104. Id. at 293 (quoting Volt Info. Sci., Inc., 489 U.S. at 478 (1989)).
105. See infra note 108 and accompanying text (describing how traditional equitable
estoppel doctrine is often misapplied in these cases).
106. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (noting that written agreements to settle controversies by
arbitration are valid and enforceable).
107. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P. v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1899-2002 (2009).
108. LaForge, supra note 4. LaForge uses the case of Grigson v. Creative Artists
Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2000), to illustrate the common factual presentation
in cases where nonsignatories seek to compel arbitration. See Laforge, supra, at 232 (noting
that Grigson is one of the “two most important cases regarding the use of equitable estoppel
to compel signatories to arbitrate with nonsignatories”). In Grigson, two producers of a
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suggests—first noting the obvious quandary with the typical case in that a
plaintiff and a nonsignatory defendant do not actually agree to arbitrate—
that courts applying equitable estoppel in these cases effectively confuse
the actual parties at controversy and neglect to apply the misrepresentation
and detrimental reliance requirements of traditional estoppel.109 That is,
these courts view the nonsignatory defendant as entering into a
hypothetical agreement to arbitrate claims with the plaintiff, regardless of
whether the plaintiff could have had any reasonable means of anticipating
such a result. But this view ostensibly distorts the traditional equitable
estoppel doctrine, which requires a minimal showing of misrepresentation
and detrimental reliance.110 In essence, the approach obfuscates traditional
contract law, and leads to uncertainty and unfairness.111
Moreover, in a case where a nonsignatory can compel arbitration or
stay litigation under this application of equitable estoppel, courts do not
necessarily look at the actions or conduct of the plaintiff who initiates the
litigation; they look only at the face of the plaintiff’s claims against a
signatory-defendant in order to ascertain whether there are overlapping
issues with claims filed against a nonsignatory-defendant.112 This in turn
horror movie sued the movie’s distribution company, alleging that the company failed to
distribute the movie as originally agreed upon. See id. at 234 (citing Grigson, 210 F.3d at
526). The producers also sued the agency of one of the stars of the movie for allegedly
interfering with the movie’s distribution and aiding the breach. See id. at 234-35 (noting
that the defendants joined Grigson in another suit against Creative Artists and Matthew
McConaughey for tortious interference with the distribution agreement). The agency sought
to enforce an arbitration clause contained in the agreement between the distribution
company and the plaintiff-producers on the grounds that the plaintiff-producers were
equitably estopped from refusing to arbitrate all claims arising from the distribution
agreement. Id.
In addition, as LaForge demonstrates, the presumption in most of these cases—even if it is
unreasonable—is that the plaintiff will attempt to hold a nonsignatory-defendant liable
under duties imposed by an underlying agreement, and as such, the nonsignatory-defendant
should be permitted to avail himself of the arbitration provisions in that agreement. Id. at
231-39.
109. Id. at 242-44.
110. Id. at 245 (citing 12 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 8:3 (4th ed.)). This definition of the traditional showing of estoppel
has been articulated by the Supreme Court in Heckler v. Community Health Services of
Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 61 (1984), where the Court noted that “[t]o analyze the
nature of a . . . party's detrimental change in position, we must identify the manner in which
reliance on the [other party’s] misconduct has caused [him] to change his position for the
worse.” Other sources specify these requirements as well. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) AGENCY § 8B (1957) (suggesting that estoppel prevents a party from insisting on
the truth of a statement contrary to a representation made upon which another party
detrimentally relied).
111. See infra Section III.C. (discussing the negative impact this practice can have on the
plaintiff’s rights).
112. See LaForge, supra note 4, at 249-50 (describing how this practice does not follow
traditional estoppel doctrine).
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may necessitate that the case against the nonsignatory be tried in
arbitration.113 And again, these courts fail to consider whether the plaintiff
in fact made any misrepresentation upon which the nonsignatory defendant
detrimentally relied.114
The quintessential case demonstrating the latter application of
equitable estoppel is MS Dealer Services Corp. v. Franklin.115 In that case,
the Eleventh Circuit specified two separate circumstances under which a
nonsignatory can compel arbitration: first, where the signatory’s claims
against the nonsignatory presume the existence of an underlying written
agreement to arbitrate or rely on the affirmative provisions of such an
agreement; and second, where the signatory’s claims “‘raise[] allegations
of . . . substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the
nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract.’”116
In MS Dealer, the plaintiff executed a buyer’s order to purchase a
vehicle from an automobile dealership.117 As part of that order, she was
charged for a third-party service contract with MS Dealer, a nonsignatory
to the underlying agreement.118 The buyer’s order contained an arbitration
clause which provided that “‘all disputes and controversies of every kind
and nature between the parties . . . arising out of or in connection with this
contract . . . shall be submitted to binding arbitration[.]’”119 Shortly after
the purchase of the car, the plaintiff discovered numerous defects in it, and
filed suit against the dealership and MS Dealer, stating claims for fraud,
breach of contract, conspiracy, and breach of warranty.120 Subsequently,
MS Dealer sought to invoke the arbitration clause by compelling the
plaintiff to arbitrate her claims against it on the theory of equitable
estoppel.121 The district court denied the motion because MS Dealer was
not a signatory to the buyer’s order and accordingly did not have legal
standing to compel arbitration.122
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court, holding that both
prongs of its test were satisfied.123 In particular, each of the plaintiff’s
claims against MS Dealer made reference to and presumed the existence of
the third-party service agreement, which was incorporated into the buyer’s

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942 (11th Cir. 1999) (“MS Dealer”).
116. Id. at 947 (quoting Boyd v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1423, 1433 (M.D.
Ala. 1997)).
117. Id. at 944.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Buyer’s Order at 1).
120. MS Dealer, 177 F.3d at 944.
121. Id. at 945.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 947.
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order.124 However, more problematically, the court also held that the
plaintiff’s claims against both the automobile dealer and MS Dealer were
based on the same facts and were therefore “inherently inseparable.”125 To
the latter point, the fact that the plaintiff alleged that MS Dealer conspired
with the signatory defendant to defraud her was material because such
allegation was “intimately founded in and intertwined with the obligations
imposed by the [Buyer’s Order].”126
As an initial matter, the first prong in MS Dealer could arguably
accord with traditional estoppel in that it conditions its application upon a
plaintiff’s unreasonable reliance on a written agreement in asserting a claim
against a nonsignatory—creating what is tantamount to an implicit
unreasonable representation. This test is problematic, though, because it
distorts traditional estoppel via its second prong. As one commentator
notes, the second prong “contains no requirement that the action against the
nonsignatory relate in any way to the agreement containing the arbitration
provision, instead allowing the nonsignatory to take advantage of the
provision if it makes allegations of ‘substantially interdependent and
concerted misconduct.’”127 In that way, the latter prong fails to consider
the nature of traditional equitable estoppel, as well as the other potential
consequences presented by asserting such a broad proposition.
As noted, LaForge illustrates that this version of equitable estoppel
both confuses the parties at controversy and is emphatically not a product
of ordinary contract law.128 Regarding the first issue, LaForge shows that
some courts, in applying the MS Dealer test, effectively confuse the actual
parties at controversy by looking to actions of reliance of a hypothetical
signatory party in order to find the necessary element of estoppel
satisfied.129 This approach “bind[s] both [actual signatory] parties to
arbitrate their contract-related claims against the world-at-large, not just
each other.”130 On the second issue, the misrepresentation requirement is
lacking in the MS Dealer test because that element essentially “considers
only the plaintiff’s claims,” vitiating the need for an actual
representation.131 That is, under the concerted misconduct prong created by
MS Dealer, courts view the nonsignatory party as effectively stepping into
124. Id. at 947-48.
125. Id. at 948.
126. Id. (quoting Boyd v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1423, 1433 (M.D. Ala.
1997)).
127. Christopher Driskill, Note, A Dangerous Doctrine: The Case Against Using
Concerted-Misconduct Estoppel to Compel Arbitration, 60 ALA. L. REV. 443, 453 (2009).
128. LaForge, supra note 4, at 245.
129. Id. at 243 (citing Grigson v. Creative Artist Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 527 (5th
Cir. 2000)).
130. Id. at 245.
131. Id. at 244.
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the shoes of a third-party signatory.132 Extending this analysis, the
nonsignatory again becomes a hypothetical signatory who “sought to avoid
[the costs and expenses of litigation] by including the arbitration provision
in its agreement . . . .”133 Yet this approach does not adequately consider
the conduct of the parties directly at controversy because those parties had
no agreement. As LaForge reasons, “[w]here traditional estoppel considers
the conduct of both parties . . . [this version] of estoppel makes an equitable
determination by looking only at the plaintiff’s claims. . . . [but fails to]
adequately determine what is equitable in . . . the relationship between the
nonsignatory defendant and plaintiff . . . .”134
While the Eleventh Circuit eventually suggested that a party had to
satisfy both prongs of the MS Dealer test in order to permit a nonsignatory
to compel arbitration,135 many courts have subsequently neglected to
impose such a restraint.136 Moreover, those courts utilizing the MS Dealer
approach seem to effectively assume that because defendants are entitled to
132. Id. at 250.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 252.
135. Driskill, supra note 127, at 455 (discussing In re Humana, Inc. Managed Care
Litig., 285 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2002)).
136. See, e.g., Palmer Ventures, L.L.C. v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 06-30584, 254 Fed.
Appx. 426, 429 (5th Cir. 2007) (permitting a nonsignatory to compel under an application of
the MS Dealer test and noting that the test permits such a result under either prong); see also
In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185, 193-94 (Tex. 2007) (“Merrill Lynch”)
(discussing federal cases permitting parties to compel arbitration under the concerted
misconduct prong and suggesting that these courts would effectively “sweep independent
entities and even complete strangers into arbitration agreements”).
Other circuits have applied equitable estoppel tests similar to the second prong of MS
Dealer. Specifically, some courts have permitted nonsignatories to compel arbitration
where a plaintiff’s claims against multiple defendants satisfy the “‘intertwined-claims’ test.”
Merrill Lynch at 193. An example of this test can be found in Ross v. American Express,
478 F.3d 96, 97 (2d Cir. 2007). In Ross, the plaintiffs filed class action suits against various
credit card companies, including American Express, alleging “violations of the Sherman Act
arising from an alleged conspiracy to fix fees for the conversion of foreign currencies.”
Ross at 97. The district court held that nonsignatory defendants were permitted to take
advantage of the arbitration clauses contained in the plaintiffs’ contracts with the other
credit card companies under the doctrine of equitable estoppel because the issues in both
cases were “inextricably intertwined,” but denied the motion to compel on other grounds,
leading to an appeal. Id. at 98 (citing Ross v. Am. Express Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21084 at *10). The Second Circuit held that it had jurisdiction under § 16(a)(1) of the FAA
to hear the appeal from the district court’s denial of the nonsignatory-defendant’s motion to
compel, notwithstanding the absence of a written agreement to arbitrate with the plaintiffclass. Id. at 99. The court noted that appellate jurisdiction over the denial was based on the
principle that ordinary contract law presumptively governs arbitration under the FAA, and
equitable estoppel is an essential tenant of ordinary contract law. Id.
This approach, though, has been interpreted to contain a requirement tantamount to the first
prong of MS Dealer—namely, that the parties have a close enough relationship that the
initial claims are based in part on the obligations under the contract containing the
arbitration clause. See Merrill Lynch, 235 S.W.3d at 193-94.
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the benefit of the arbitration clause, the requirement of a written agreement
to arbitrate under §§ 3 and 4 of the FAA is implicitly satisfied.137 In line
with Professor Sternlight’s reasoning, however, bestowing the benefit of an
arbitration agreement on a party who was not a signatory, and who did not
detrimentally rely on a misrepresentation, unfairly usurps the other party’s
right of access to the courts without so much as considering inequity or
constitutional implication.
In sum, allowing a nonsignatory defendant to compel arbitration or
to stay litigation under this formulation of the MS Dealer application of
equitable estoppel fails to consider the underlying theoretical basis of
traditional estoppel and, as LaForge concludes, leads to “inequitable
results,” at least where concerted misconduct is all that is alleged.138 The
plaintiff’s right to jury trial falls by the wayside of efficiency
considerations and federal pro-arbitration policy.139 Finally, as discussed in
the following section, it is unlikely that a waiver argument changes the
ultimate result of a Seventh Amendment violation in these instances.
C. Waiver
The right to trial by jury may, like other constitutional rights, be
waived.140 This proposition has obvious implications for agreements to
arbitrate. Accordingly, a discussion of jury trial waiver jurisprudence and
its effect on arbitration clauses is necessary.
Federal courts vary in their treatment of jury trial waivers.141 When
assessing the validity of any waiver of a constitutional right, courts apply

137. See, e.g., Realty Trust Group, Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
91331, at *9 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 11, 2007) (discussing how the factors of the MS Dealer test
relate to the requirement of a plaintiff’s reliance on a written agreement).
138. See infra Section III.C.
139. LaForge interestingly notes the rhetoric of one court that reiterated the proarbitration policy in applying the second prong of MS Dealer. See LaForge, supra note 4, at
244 (noting that, in Grigson, the court “repeats the shibboleth that arbitration is favored in
[the] law” by suggesting that “unless the plaintiff is estopped from litigating its claims
against the nonsignatory defendant, the ‘federal policy in favor of arbitration [will be]
effectively thwarted.’” (quoting Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524,
527 (5th Cir. 2000))).
140. See Melissa Briggs Hutchens, At What Costs?: When Consumers Cannot Afford the
Costs of Arbitration in Alabama, 53 ALA. L. REV. 599, 602 n. 23 (2002) (explaining that the
federal right to a jury trial can be waived) (citing JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD R. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.8, at 585 nn.10-11 (6th ed. 2000)).
141. Andrew M. Kepper, Note, Contractual Waiver of Seventh Amendment Rights:
Using the Public Rights Doctrine to Justify a Higher Standard of Waiver for Jury-Waiver
Clauses than for Arbitration Clauses, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1345, 1348 (2006) (citing Jean
Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right
to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 675 (2001)).
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different standards.142 Specifically, if the right to a jury trial in a civil case
is to be waived, it typically must be done so knowingly and voluntarily.143
While it is unclear whether the “knowing and voluntary” standard has
ever applied to waivers in contracts containing only arbitration clauses but
no explicit jury-waiver clauses, many commentators appear to recognize
that most courts apply a more lenient waiver standard to arbitration
agreements.144 Indeed, courts tend to view the “loss of the right to a jury
trial . . . [as] a necessary and fairly obvious consequence of an agreement to
arbitrate.”145
Because the FAA employs general state contract law principles to
ascertain the validity of arbitration clauses in the first instance,146 many
courts assume that one loses their right to a jury trial solely upon a minimal
showing of mutual assent to enter into an underlying agreement containing
such a clause.147 To this end, as another commentator puts it, “courts find
consent to arbitration, not through the actual intentions or understandings
of the parties, but by looking at whether a reasonable person would believe
that an agreement to arbitrate had been reached.”148
Professor Sternlight cogently explains that the vast majority of courts
simply “conclude that the jury trial doctrines are not relevant” to arbitration
clauses because of the federal policy favoring arbitration.149 She further
argues that the “knowing and voluntary” standard applied to jury trial
waiver clauses in general should be applied in the arbitration context.150
That courts use the federal policy favoring arbitration as an excuse not to,

142. Id.; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848
(1989) (“Article III does not confer on litigants an absolute right to the plenary
consideration of every nature of claim by an Article III court.”).
143. See Leasing Service Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that
the right to jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, while fundamental, “can be knowingly
and intentionally waived by contract”); accord RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp.
2d 811, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (reasoning that the “federal standard for determining the
validity of a contractual waiver of the right to a jury trial is . . . whether the waiver was
made in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent manner”); cf. Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367
F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that while waivers should be knowingly and
voluntarily given, not every contract need mandate a waiver expressly).
144. See Kepper, supra note 141, at 1351-55 (“In contrast to jury-waiver clauses, federal
courts generally do not employ a knowing and voluntary standard when determining the
validity of arbitration clauses.”); see also Sternlight, supra note 141, at 698-99 (noting that
most courts have applied objective contract rules on assent to arbitration clauses).
145. Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1984) (refusing
to find that an arbitration clause contained in a contract was unconscionable despite the fact
that the plaintiffs challenging it claimed that they were unaware of its implied limitations).
146. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
147. Kepper, supra note 141, at 1351.
148. Id.
149. Sternlight, supra note 141, at 711-13.
150. Id.
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she contends, “is, quite simply, a non-explanation, because the Constitution
is the Supreme Law of the Land.”151
Professor Sternlight’s argument that the “knowing and voluntary”
standard should apply uniformly is compelling because courts consistently
fail to offer convincing explanations for why a federal statute seemingly
dwarfs a constitutional right. Moreover, Professor Sternlight’s illustration
of these problems is amplified with respect to arbitration clauses contained
in unfairly-imposed consumer contracts,152 but there are distinctions
between the implications of the right to a jury trial with respect to these
latter agreements, and those that simply cannot be said to have been
products of a true “meeting of the minds.”
It is axiomatic that forcing a plaintiff to arbitrate with a nonsignatory
under the noted misapplication of equitable estoppel appears to implicate
the Seventh Amendment because the plaintiff under these circumstances
cannot be said to have knowingly or intelligently waived his right to trial
by jury. However, neither can he be said to have waived this right under
the mutual assent standard. That is because, in these cases, there is not an
underlying agreement between the parties at issue.153 The absence of such
an agreement necessitates the inference that plaintiffs who are forced to
arbitrate with nonsignatory-defendants in cases applying the MS Dealer test
never actually waived their right to a jury trial.154
IV. CONCLUSION
By refusing to limit the ability of nonsignatories to avail themselves
of arbitration clauses under the FAA, the Court’s decision in Carlisle may
have a wider impact than Justice Scalia intended. This is because his
opinion has implicitly sanctioned the discretionary capacity of district
judges to continue applying inequitable third-party theories in the

151. Id. at 716.
152. Sternlight, supra note 100, at 22-24.
153. See supra Section III.B. (discussing how the right to jury trial is implicated in
equitable estoppel cases).
154. See, e.g., Driskill, supra note 127, at 456-60 (discussing courts that have permitted
nonsignatories to compel arbitration under the second prong of the MS Dealer test). On a
related note, under Professor Sternlight’s suggestion that binding arbitration clauses
contained in unfairly imposed consumer contracts could potentially constitute a violation of
an individual’s Seventh Amendment rights, it is reasonable to infer that, at least in many
cases presenting these circumstances, a litigant may have realistically had no intention of
agreeing to such an arbitration clause. However, the argument that an individual’s Seventh
Amendment rights are violated in cases where a nonsignatory is able to compel another to
arbitrate pursuant to a misapplication of equitable estoppel carries force because of its
palpable inequity. A signatory party in the latter case simply never entered into an
agreement, and has little capacity, a fortiori, of preventing or anticipating the result.
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arbitration context that can usurp a plaintiff’s right to jury trial.155 In
illustration of this aspect, decisions like MS Dealer have established that a
nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement can unfairly compel arbitration
under a misapplication of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.156 A plaintiff
under these circumstances cannot anticipate having to arbitrate with a
nonsignatory-defendant pursuant to the MS Dealer test because under its
application of equitable estoppel, the plaintiff’s claims need not evidence
consent to arbitrate and there is no definite requirement that the plaintiff
unreasonably rely on any agreement in asserting his claims. Further, there
is no requirement that he make a misrepresentation upon which the
nonsignatory detrimentally relied. Finally, because no agreement between
the parties exists, the argument for waiver appears weak. It seems that, at
least in some cases, this approach may conceivably deny plaintiffs their
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.

155. See supra Section III.A. (explaining how the federal pro-arbitration policy
sometimes usurps the right to trial by jury).
156. See, e.g., Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v. Asimco Int'l, Inc., 526 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2008).

